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MYTH, MANIPULATION, AND MINOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL: HOW A CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
ENGENDERS INCOME INEQUALITY
Phillip J. Closius*
Joseph S. Stephan**

I. INTRODUCTION
Dreams are the foundation of American culture.1 Dreams have always
been with us: the early religious image of America as a “city upon a hill,”2
the immigrant dream that education leads to a better life,3 the ideal that
anyone can grow up to be President,4 the belief that hard work will always
pay off,5 America as the land of equal opportunity for all6—to name but
a few. This Article deals with one of America’s most deep-seated dreams:
the wish of a child—and frequently the child’s parents—to play a
professional sport. The dream of becoming a professional athlete has
engendered an industry of travel teams and specialized coaches catering
to the athletic development of grade school children.7 As children
become adults, their love of the game turns them into fans who support
multi-billion dollar sports leagues.8
Concepts of capitalism are as enduring as dreams in American culture.9
Although the modern American economy contains socialistic programs
begun in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration,10 the cultural dialogue
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law
** University of Baltimore School of Law, J.D. May 2020
1. See Matthew Wills, James Truslow Adams: Dreaming up the American Dream, JSTOR
DAILY (May 18, 2015), https://daily.jstor.org/james-truslow-adams-dreaming-american-dream/.
2. See John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity (1630).
3. See Vanessa Vallejos, Youth Voices: Life, Liberty, and Justice for All, HARV. EDUC. REV.,
Fall 2011, available at https://www.hepg.org/her-home/issues/harvard-educational-review-volume81-number-3/herarticle/_835.
4. See RICHARD K. LAIRD, THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: WHEN LOYALTY MINIMIZES
LEARNING 210 (2019).
5. See Scott Horsley, Obama's Own Story Defines His American Dream, NPR (May 30, 2012,
4:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2012/05/30/153994202/obamas-own-story-defines-his-americandream.
6. See JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA 214 (1931).
7. See Survey: Youth Baseball Participation on the Rise, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/27448703/youth-baseball-participation-rise.
8. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21,
2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for2019/#172b58195d78.; Robert Kuenster, Why Fans Love the Game of Baseball, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2019,
10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertkuenster/2019/01/18/why-fans-love-the-game-of-baseball/#7ef6115117a1.
9. See Sven Beckert & Christine Desan, The New History of American Capitalism, HARVARD
BUS. SCH. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/the-new-history-of-american-capitalism.
10. See Peter Canellos, What FDR Understood About Socialism that Today’s Democrats
Don’t, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/16/democratssocialism-fdr-roosevelt-227622.
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of today’s America remains overwhelmingly capitalistic. Americans are
suspicious of handouts and welfare.11 The term “socialism” and the label
“socialist” are unpopular with a majority of Americans.12 Capitalism has
earned its place in the cultural lexicon by providing Americans with an
efficient free market economy. In recent years, American wealth has
grown exponentially as technology has enabled capitalistic practices to be
adapted to the global economy.13 However, this economic boom has
made the deficiencies of capitalism in America increasingly obvious. One
of the most glaring deficiencies is growing income inequality.14
American dreams and values should be reflected in the federal
legislature, the most powerful branch of the republic created by the
Constitution.15 The division of Congress into two chambers was intended
as a check on this power.16
The population-based House of
Representatives was limited by the state-based Senate.17 The Framers
intended this structure to make Congress a reflection of a rational
majoritarian will.18 This reality is best illustrated by the legislative
implementation of The New Deal which transformed America from a
libertarian state-dominated republic into a quasi-socialist federaldominated democracy.19 An overwhelming majority of the population
used Congress to reject a system that was not working and create the
foundation for modern America’s power and wealth.20 More recently,
however, Congress has become increasingly manipulated by wealth
generated by capitalism, especially as the cost of running for office
soars.21 Campaign contributions and political lobbying are two methods
by which the wealthy achieve their legislative goals. The political
influence of wealth has increased income disparity at a shocking rate.22
11. See Emily Ekins, What Americans Think About Poverty, Wealth, and Work, CATO
INSTITUTE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/survey-reports/what-americansthink-about-poverty-wealth-work.
12. See id. (“A majority (59%) of Americans have favorable views of the word ‘capitalism,’
while 39% have an unfavorable view of it. In reverse, 39% of Americans have a favorable view of
the word ‘socialism,’ while 59% view socialism negatively.”).
13. See Jerry Harris, Globalization, Technology and the Transnational Capitalist Class, 17
FORESIGHT 194 (2015).
14. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, How Capitalism Actually Generates More Inequality,
EVONOMICS (Aug. 11, 2016), https://evonomics.com/how-capitalism-actually-generates-moreinequality/.
15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
16. See id.
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3.
18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
19. See Louis Menand, How the Deal Went Down, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2013),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/how-the-deal-went-down.
20. See id.
21. See Soo Rin Kim, The Price of Winning Just Got Higher, Especially in the Senate,
OPENSECRETS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/the-price-of-winningjust-got-higher-especially-in-the-senate/; see supra Part IV.B.
22. See As Inequality Grows, So Does the Political Influence of the Rich, THE ECONOMIST (July
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The wealthy have frequently exploited American dreams as a means of
increasing their resources. The manipulation of dreams by wealthy
capitalists is clearly illustrated in the context of American professional
sports. Professional sports generate billions of dollars for team owners,
as well as large incomes and public acclaim for elite professional
athletes.23 However, the path to becoming an elite athlete runs through
fierce competition against thousands of other athletes in various age
brackets.24 Professional sports are vicious competitions of attrition in
which the elite rise above the less talented and injured. As stated by Sara
Teristi, a gymnast who was a victim of Michigan State Dr. Larry Nassar:
“People don’t understand how many broken girls it takes to produce an
elite athlete.”25 Elite athletes cannot be created or identified without the
cauldron of travel teams, AAU teams, high school teams, college teams,
and minor leagues. Without elite athletes, the enormous revenue
generated by professional sports will disappear.
Income inequality is evident in the financial realities of aspiring
professional athletes who do not reach the highest level of their sport. As
the major sports leagues generate billions of dollars, the economic plight
of the athletes who do not “make it,” but who support the developmental
system of those who do, is becoming increasingly obvious.26 Wealthy
individuals who own major sports leagues increase their resources by
exploiting a dream and manipulating the law.27 The plight of minor
league baseball (“MiLB”) players best exemplifies this reality.28 The
dream of being a professional baseball player has long held a special place
in American culture.29 Baseball owners exploit that dream by
21, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/07/21/as-inequality-growsso-does-the-political-influence-of-the-rich.
23.
However, for many elite athletes, even their wealth is an illusion. Despite making
millions during their careers, many professional athletes experience financial difficulties shortly
after their retirement from sports. See Leigh Steinberg, 5 Reasons Why 80% of Retired NFL Players
Go
Broke,
FORBES
(Feb.
9,
2015,
3:51
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2015/02/09/5-reasons-why-80-of-retired-nfl-playersgo-broke/#1e4cb10678cc (It is “estimated that 80% of retired NFL players go broke in their first
three years out of the League.”).
24.
See Estimated Probability of Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professionalathletics (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
25.
Abigail Pesta, The Survivor, TIME, July, 29, 2019, at 48.
26.
See Dirk Hayhurst, An Inside Look into the Harsh Conditions of Minor League
Baseball, BLEACHER REPORT (May 14, 2014), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2062307-aninside-look-into-the-harsh-conditions-of-minor-league-baseball; see also Jon Solomon, The History
Behind the Debate over Paying NCAA Athletes, ASPEN INSTITUTE (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behind-debate-paying-ncaa-athletes/.
27.
See Hayhurst, supra note 26 (“[A]t its lowest levels, professional baseball is
exploitation. It has been for years—decades. So long, in fact, that it has become a victim of its own
belief system: that a player must sacrifice and succumb to unfair treatment as part of ‘chasing the
dream.’”); infra Part IV.
28.
See infra Part III.B.
29. See DAVID LAMB, THE MINORS, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 146, 149 (1st
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underpaying MiLB players who have almost no chance of making a Major
League team.30 Owners also use their political influence to deny MiLB
players many of the rights generally enjoyed by other Americans.31
MiLB players dedicate their lives to perfecting their craft and chasing
their major league dreams. During the season, most MiLB players work
well over forty hours per week at a rate lower than the federal poverty
level.32 Furthermore, their work is not limited to the baseball season, and
the players are not compensated for their mandatory participation in
workouts, spring training, and development leagues.33 A former player’s
reflection on his professional baseball career in the minors illustrates the
plight of MiLB players:
I wasn’t lucky to be there, I earned it. I worked my ass off to get to that
point in my career and wouldn’t change a second of it. But, I was treated
like property. Speaking up now has taught me a lot about this country: I
should be grateful for the opportunity and keep my mouth shut about the
quality of life they present to me.
My 2017 season lasted seven months, March through September. March
was unpaid. April – unpaid. May – unpaid. Sixteen days in June – unpaid.
For 8-10 hours a day, six days a week, for sixteen weeks, I made $0. For
my short season (72 games), I was paid $45 per game, or $3 an hour for 70
hours a week. I was guaranteed two meals in my contract and rarely got
food to eat. I had to purchase my own equipment (bats, cleats, batting
gloves, first base mitt, etc.), rent, travel, and $80 a month for a group of
rich high schoolers to clean my jersey. I played in front of 8,000 people a
night and went to bed hungry. I made less money that summer than the
batboy and after seven months of work, I left with less money than I started,
and $2000 in credit card debt.
I was ultimately released after that season due to a back injury. I couldn’t
even walk as I received that phone call.34

With wages below the poverty line and no mobility to market their
services, MiLB players are stuck in a broken system in which pre-existing
economic security is nearing the status of a prerequisite for a successful

ed., 1994).
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
34. Jeremy Wolf, I’ve Lived My Dream, BASEBALL & BUSINESS (June 6, 2018),
https://www.baseballandbusiness.com/ive-lived-my-dream/. The grind of minor league life, as
illustrated by Wolf, is also depicted by social media accounts dedicated to posting anonymous
player-submitted content showing horrifying minor league conditions from a humorous angle. See
Andersen Pickard, Talking About the Grind of Life as a Minor League Baseball Player with
“MinorLeagueGrinders”,
MLB DAILY DISH
(Oct.
10,
2018,
11:00
AM),
https://www.mlbdailydish.com/2018/10/10/17919590/talking-about-the-grind-of-life-as-a-minorleague-baseball-player-with-minorleaguegrinders.
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baseball career.35 For many players, the financial realities of everyday
life turn the pursuit of a dream into a financial nightmare.36 Since the
dawn of free agency four decades ago, average Major League Baseball
player salaries have grown about 10,000%.37 In the same period, average
MiLB pay has not even increased enough to cover inflation.38
This broken system has developed, in part, as a result of Major League
Baseball’s ability to buy legislative favors that specifically exempt MiLB
from the strictures of federal antitrust law and the requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).39 Although the failures of the courts and
collective activity are also to blame, Congressional activity, bought and
paid for by Major League Baseball, has deprived MiLB players of the
ability to sue for both violations of the antitrust laws and the FLSA.40 As
Major League Baseball and MiLB set new revenue records each year,
major league players share in the riches while their minor league brothers
languish in poverty. Baseball is therefore a microcosm of the income
inequality that afflicts the nation.
Part II of this Article explains the structure of the minor leagues and
the Rule 4 Draft.41 Part III illustrates the income inequality present in the
minor leagues.42 Part IV explains how Major League Baseball has used
the law to perpetuate the inequity plaguing the overwhelming majority of
minor league players.43
II. THE STRUCTURE OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
MiLB is divided into five classes: Triple A (“AAA”), Double A
(“AA”), Class A (“A” or “Single-A”), Class A Short Season, and
Rookie.44 Furthermore, Class A is split into Class A Advanced (“High
A”) and Class A.45 The Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA)
“provides industry stability” and binds Major League Baseball teams and
MiLB affiliates through a series of Player Development Contracts
35. See infra Part III.
36. See Amy Moritz, Playing America’s ‘War of Attrition,’ THE BUFFALO NEWS (July 3,
2016), https://buffalonews.com/2016/07/03/playing-americas-war-of-attrition/.
37. See Ted Berg, $12,000 a Year: A Minor Leaguer Takes His fight for Fair Pay Public,
FTW.USATODAY.COM (Jan. 31, 2017,9:18 AM), https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/01/minor-leaguebaseball-pay-fair-labor-standards-act-minimum-wage-lawsuit-kyle-johnson.
38. See id.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. Overview of Baseball’s Minor League Organization, THE SPORTS ADVISORY GROUP,
http://www.thesportsadvisorygroup.com/resourcelibrary/business-of-sports/overview-ofbaseballs-minor-league-organization/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2018).
45. Id.
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(PDCs).46 Each season, there are approximately 6,500 players throughout
the minor league ranks.47
The players, managers, coaches, trainers, and other staff throughout the
minor leagues are paid by Major League Baseball.48 Each year, MiLB
teams pay a fee to Major League Baseball.49 Under the current PBA,
MiLB pays a total of $20 million each season to Major League Baseball.50
In 2018, Major League Baseball saw record gross revenues of $10.3
billion.51 In 2019, Major League Baseball revenue increased again to
$10.7 billion.52 MiLB is also prospering; merchandising revenue has
increased nearly every year over the past decade53 and team valuations
have soared over the past few decades.54
In the National Football League and the National Basketball
Association, most drafted players begin their careers making comfortable
salaries on the roster of the organization which drafted them in the next
season immediately after being drafted, without spending several years in
development leagues.55 In contrast, players drafted by Major League
46. Benjamin Hill, Minors Extend Agreement Through 2020, MILB (Mar. 8, 2011),
https://www.milb.com/milb/news/minors-extend-agreement-through-2020/c-16867482.
47. Maury Brown, Minor League Ballplayers Would Lose Minimum Wage Rights As Part Of
$1.3 Trillion Spending Bill, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
maurybrown/2018/03/22/minor- league-ballplayers-will-lose-minimum-wage-rights-as-part-of-13-trillion-spending-bill/#41b0e47337fa.
48. Maury Brown, Minimum Wage Exemption is the Culmination of a Battle over MLB and
Minor
League
Baseball
Economics,
FORBES
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/ 2018/03/26/the-fragile-economics-between-mlb-theminors-and-the-minimum-wage-exemption/#47dfa383c219.
49. Id.
50. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-leaguebaseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred.
51. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues of $10.3 Billion for 2018, FORBES (Jan. 07,
2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/01/07/mlb-sees-record-revenuesof-10-3-billion-for-2018/#2abb07865bea.
52. Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record $10.7 Billion in Revenues for 2019, FORBES (Dec. 21,
2019, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/12/21/mlb-sees-record-107-billion-in-revenues-for2019/#172b58195d78.
53. See David Broughton, MiLB, Teams Had Record Merchandising Sales in 2018, SPORTS
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(July
8,
2019),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/07/08/Research-and-Ratings/MiLBmerchandise.aspx (“Minor League Baseball and its 160 clubs in the U.S. and Canada combined to
a record $73.9 million in merchandise sales [in 2018] . . . . That’s up 4% from 2017’s $70.9 million
and marks the category’s ninth straight annual increase.”).
54. See Ray Glier, Minor League Baseball is Better Business, Not Bigger Business, USA
TODAY (May 8, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2017/05/08/minorleague-baseball-better-business-not-bigger-business/101451572/ (“[T]he valuations of teams in
many markets has soared. Class AA teams that 30 years ago were worth $500,000 are now worth
$16 million to $25 million in some markets”); Sergei Klebnikov, Minor League Baseball’s Most
Valuable
Teams,
FORBES
(July
8,
2016,
11:11
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2016/07/08/minor-league-baseballs-most-valuableteams/#6ff4581443b2 (“Minor League Baseball’s 20 most valuable teams are now worth an average
$37.5 million, up almost 35% from 2013 when FORBES last published its MiLB valuations”).
55. See Topher Doll, How Long Does the Average Draft Pick Stick Around?, MILE HIGH
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Baseball teams begin their careers in MiLB. The Major League Baseball
First-Year Player Draft (known as the “Rule 4 Draft”) is forty rounds long
and results in over 1,200 players drafted each year from the United States,
Canada and Puerto Rico.56 There are more than 240 MiLB teams
affiliated with the thirty Major League Baseball clubs. 57 If a player is
selected in the Rule 4 Draft, the Major League Baseball team which
drafted him holds the exclusive rights to sign him, and will assign the
player to one of the team’s minor league affiliates after signing him to a
contract.58
If the player chooses to sign with the team who drafted him instead of
continuing his amateur career at the college level, or his collegiate
eligibility has expired, he is required by the Major League Rules (MLRs)
to sign a MiLB Uniform Player Contract (UPC).59 If a player refuses to
sign the UPC, he is disqualified “from playing with the contracting Club
or entering the service of any Major or Minor League Club unless the
player is released or assigned.”60 The UPC contains a reserve clause that
keeps a player under control of the Major League Baseball club for seven
seasons—effectively eliminating all of the player’s mobility and
bargaining power during that period.61 This sort of control, paired with
the owners’ manipulation of the players’ dreams, breeds income
inequality that pervades throughout the minor leagues.
III. INCOME INEQUALITY IN MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
As required by the MLRs, all first-year players are compensated
equally, regardless of the classification of the MiLB team to which the
player is assigned.62 There is a mandated maximum salary of $1,100 per
month for all players in their first contract season.63 After the first season,
REPORT (May 13, 2014), https://www.milehighreport.com/2014/5/13/5713996/how-long-does-theaverage-draft-pick-stick-around.
56. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book 47 (2019),
available at https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules.pdf, [https://perma.cc/GDM35JMZ]. Although the Rule 4 draft has historically been 40 rounds, its future length is unclear. MLB
and the MLBPA agreed in March of 2020 that the 2020 Rule 4 draft would only be 5 rounds and the
2021 Rule 4 draft would be a minimum of 20 rounds.
57. Teams by Affiliation, MILB, http://www.milb.com/ milb/info/affiliations.jsp (last visited
Dec. 26, 2018).
58. See First-Year Player Draft Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last
visited Dec. 26, 2018).
59. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 27-28.Foreign first-year players who are not
subject to the Rule 4 Draft are required to sign a similar UPC to begin their careers. Id.
60. Id. at 40.
61. Id. at 27-28.
62. Id. at 29.
63. Brandon Sneed, This is What It’s Like to Chase Your Pro Baseball Dreams…For 12 Bucks
an Hour, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 3, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2700299-this-iswhat-its-like-to-chase-your-pro-baseball-dreamsfor-12-bucks-an-hour. See also The Business of
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the UPC empowers the MiLB team to reduce the player’s compensation
by 20% each season.64 Salaries beyond the first season are also dictated
by the classification of a player’s assigned team.65 Minimum salaries are
low, and the average salaries are not much higher than the minimum.66
The weekly minimum salary for players at the rookie ball and Class A
levels is $290.67 The weekly minimum increases to $350 at the Double
A level, and $502 in Triple A.68 While on the road, players also receive
a $25 per diem.69
Most drafted players will receive a signing bonus when they execute
the UPC.70 This bonus is in addition to the weekly salaries noted above.71
The signing bonuses drafted players receive varies drastically due to the
draft being forty rounds long.72 The signing bonuses are usually, but not
always, tied to the round in which a player is drafted.73 The signing bonus
can be millions of dollars for first round players but drops precipitously
as each round passes.74 Signing bonuses also vary greatly within each
round.75 Players drafted after the first ten rounds may receive signing
bonuses up to $125,000, which can increase if the team is willing to pay
the excess from its bonus pool allotment.76 By the twentieth round of the
2019 draft, some players received $125,000, but others signed for as little
MiLB, MILB, https://www.milb.com/about/faqs-business (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
64. Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at at 209-10.
65. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
66. The average monthly salaries for minor league players in 2017 was: $1,300 in Class A,
$1,600 in Class A Advanced, $3,000 in Double A, and $10,000 in Triple A. See Ronald Blum,
Baseball Players in Minors to Lose Minimum Wage Protection, AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/cb183f59e88948e8b9cd49ad07bde807. However, the Triple A average is
skewed by the few players who earn significantly more because they are on major league 40-man
rosters. See Sneed, supra note 63. The 40-man roster is the pool of players who can be added to the
typical 25-man major league active roster. This type of roster move typically occurs when players
on the active roster take paternity leave or are forced to miss extended time due to an injury. Those
players who are on the 40-man roster but not the 25-man active roster remain in the minors awaiting
the call. See also, infra note 67 (“For players on 40-man rosters on option to the minors, the
minimum is $46,000” for the 2020 season.). Because this unique situation skews the mean, the
median monthly Triple A salary of $5,000 is a more representative statistic. See Sneed, supra note
63.
67. Associated Press, MLB to Raise Minimum Salaries for Minor League Players in 2021,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.si.com/mlb/2020/02/14/mlb-minor-leagueplayer-salary-increases-2021.
68. Id.
69. Blum, supra note 66.
70. See infra note 72.
71. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
72. See Justin Perline, Amateur Draft Bonus Analysis, BEYONDTHEBOXSCORE (Dec. 1, 2017,
12:00
PM),
https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2017/12/1/16715898/amateur-draft-bonusanalysis-slot-mlb.
73. See Jim Callis, Here are the 2019 Draft Pools and Bonus Values, MLB (June 3, 2019),
https://www.mlb.com/news/2019-mlb-draft-pools-and-bonus-values.
74. See id.
75. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
76. See id.
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as $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000.77 By round 30, fewer players received
$125,000 and even more signed for $10,000 or less.78
The cold reality of MiLB life is that the total baseball income,
excluding the signing bonus, that most players receive for the entire year
is less than $7,500.79 Additionally, most MiLB players live below the
federal poverty level.80
Of course, these values represent the
compensation that the players receive before taxes, rent, food, childcare,
clubhouse dues, and other expenses.81
As a result, many players are forced to rely on their signing bonus to
support themselves and their families for years until they make the big
leagues (if they ever do). Many Americans (even fans who attend games)
assume that because they are professional athletes, MiLB players receive
large signing bonuses and annual salaries for their services.82 In reality,
this assumption is an exception available only to the most coveted
prospects.83 MiLB players are therefore divided into two groups — early
round draftees with large signing bonuses and a quicker path to Major
League Baseball84 and the vast majority of the 6,500 minor league players
with lesser signing bonuses and even smaller chances of making it to
MLB.85 This divide is exemplified by the careers of two players, each
chasing the same dream.
A. The Exception: Bryce Harper
The Washington Nationals selected Bryce Harper with the first overall
pick in the 2010 Draft and signed him to a contract that included a $6.25
million signing bonus.86 Harper was one of the most coveted prospects

77. Round 20, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC,
https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-20/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
78. Round 30, MLB 2019 Draft Tracker, SPOTRAC,
https://www.spotrac.com/mlb/draft/2019/round-30/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
79. Brown, supra note 48.
80. Id. Unfortunately, the planned increase in minor league salaries scheduled to take effect
for the 2021 season will not change this disturbing reality. See Federal Poverty Level (FPL),
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2020); see also Associated Press, supra note 67.
81. See Sneed, supra note 63. Clubhouse dues are “money for the clubhouse managers, known
as ‘clubbies,’ who handle player laundry and pre- and postgame food spreads, which are more like
cheap sandwiches (peanut butter and jelly, maybe deli meat on a good day or perhaps a sloppy joe)
and plain potato chips.” Id.
82. See Id.
83. See infra Part III.A.
84. See infra Part III.A.
85. See infra Part III.B.
86. Adam Kilgore, Washington Nationals Sign Bryce Harper to $9.9 Million Contract,
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2010, 2:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
article/2010/08/16/AR2010081605133.html?noredirect=on.
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in history.87 At the age of 16, Harper appeared on the cover of a Sports
Illustrated magazine which described him as “the most exciting prodigy
since LeBron” and dubbed him “Baseball’s Chosen One.”88 Harper’s
experience—receiving a large signing bonus and quickly rising through
the minor leagues to the big leagues—illustrates an unusual path available
to only the most talented top prospects.
Harper began his minor league career in 2011 with the Class A
Hagerstown Suns, and was promoted to the Double A Harrisburg
Senators by the end of the 2011 season.89 Harper then began the 2012
season at the Triple A level, before making his major league debut early
in that season and playing in 139 of 162 games for the Nationals that
year.90 As one of the most highly-regarded prospects of all-time, Harper’s
meteoric rise to the big leagues is atypical. A decade after appearing on
the cover of Sports Illustrated, Harper fulfilled the cover’s prophecy and
signed a record-breaking thirteen-year contract with the Philadelphia
Phillies worth $330 million guaranteed with an additional $10.4 million
in available bonuses.91 Harper, who advanced to the big leagues quickly
and originally received a large signing bonus, did not endure many of the
hardships that most minor leaguers face.
B. The Rule: Kyle Johnson
The career of Kyle Johnson, who was drafted by the Los Angeles
Angels in the 25th round of the 2012 draft, more accurately illustrates the
experience of the majority of MiLB players.92 While Bryce Harper was
a household name at age 16, most baseball fans have still never heard of
Kyle Johnson.93 This phenomenon has led some to refer to minor leaguers
as “the invisible men of the sport.”94
87. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
88. Tom Verducci, Baseball’s LeBron, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 8, 2009, at cover (article
at page 62).
89. Bryce Harper Fall & Minor League Statistics, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
https://www.baseballreference.com/register/ player.fcgi?id=harper002bry (last visited Dec. 24,
2018).
90. Id.
91. Mike Axisa, Bryce Harper Contract Details: Breakdown of the Salary, Bonuses, and Perks
in His 13-year Deal with the Phillies, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 1, 2019, 7:34 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/bryce-harper-contract-details-breakdown-of-the-salarybonuses-and-perks-in-his-13-year-deal-with-the-phillies/; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
Less than three weeks after Harper inked the record-breaking deal, Mike Trout shattered Harper’s
record by signing a 12-year extension with the Angels for $430 million. See Scott Allen, Mike Trout
Upstages Bryce Harper Again, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2019, 11:47 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/03/19/mike-trout-upstages-bryce-harper-again/.
92. See Sneed, supra note 63; Verducci, supra note 88.
93. See Verducci, supra note 88.
94. Theodore McDowell, Changing the Game: Remedying the Deficiencies of Baseball’s
Antitrust Exemption in the Minor Leagues, 9 J. HARV. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 1 (2018).
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Since only about 10% of MiLB prospects reach the major leagues, the
chilling reality for about 90% of minor leaguers resembles Johnson’s
bleak financial situation.95 Johnson received a signing bonus of $5,000,
which came out to about $3,100 after taxes.96 After signing his UPC,
Johnson began his professional baseball career in Utah at the Rookie level
with the Orem Owlz, where he received about $420 for his first biweekly
paycheck.97 Johnson made about $2,500 in the first year of his
professional career, which he calculated to be about $35 per game.98
Johnson spent the next few years of his professional career playing at
various levels.99 He spent 2013 playing in Class A and Class A
Advanced, and played Double A for the entire 2014 season.100 Johnson
split the 2015 season between Triple A, Rookie ball, and Class A
Advanced.101 He then played Double A and Triple A during the 2016
season, which would turn out to be the final year of his professional
career.102
For Johnson, who has a degree in economics and “exists in the top
0.001 percentile of talent in his field,” chasing his dream in the minors
meant relying on the roughly $30,000 his wife earned from multiple jobs
to keep their family afloat.103 Johnson was also forced to borrow a vehicle
from his aunt and uncle for transportation, give baseball lessons for extra
income, and even intern at Northwestern Mutual in the offseason when
his unpaid offseason baseball obligations did not interfere.104 Johnson
played five seasons in the minors and advanced as high as the Triple A
level, but never made more than $11,500 in a season.105 During spring
training heading in to his sixth season, Johnson felt financial pressures as
he pondered his future.106
95. See Matthew Durham, Minor League Compensation and the Save America’s Pastime Act
of 2018, THE NEV. LAW., Aug. 2018, at 17, 17; see also Nathan Sorensen, Minor League
Ballplayers' Path to the Bigs has Major Obstacles, so Family is No Small Thing, DESERET NEWS
(May 15, 2015, 4:25 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865628804/Minor-leagueballplayers-path-to-the-bigs-has-major-obstacles-so-family-is-no-small-thing.html.
96. Sneed, supra note 63.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Kyle Johnson Minor & Winter Leagues Statistics and History, BASEBALLREFERENCE.COM, https://www.baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=johnso005kyl (last
visited Jan. 3, 2018).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Berg, supra note 37; see Sneed, supra note 63.
104. Sneed, supra note 63. Despite baseball obligations, many players must take flexible
offseason jobs—such as substitute teaching and waiting tables—to make ends meet. See Tom
Goldman, Fight Against Low, Low Pay In Minor League Baseball Continues Despite New Obstacles,
NPR (Aug. 3, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/03/635373608/fight-against-low-lowpay-in-minor-league-baseball-continues-despite-new-obstacl.
105. Sneed, supra note 63.
106. See id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Before spring training, Johnson became the first active minor league
player “to publicly declare his part in an ongoing class-action lawsuit
against Major League Baseball over unfair wages and unjust labor
practices.”107 Although the work was mandatory, Johnson was not even
being compensated for his work during spring training, as the UPC he
signed in 2012 specified that he was “obligate[d] . . . to perform
professional services on a calendar year basis, regardless of the fact that
salary payments are to be made only during the actual championship
playing season.”108 At this time, Johnson was still under the control of
the New York Mets for two more years.109 The Mets rejected his request
for a higher salary, leaving Johnson with only three options.110
His first option was to play for the next two seasons until he would
become a free agent at the end of his UPC.111 Otherwise, Johnson could
retire from professional baseball or ask to be released.112 Burdened by
the cost of chasing his dream, Johnson asked for his release and the Mets
obliged.113 The trying financial realities of the minor leagues and the
difficulty of supporting his wife and two young children led Johnson to
end his baseball career.114 Johnson’s story is a familiar tragedy to most
minor league players and represents the effects of Major League
Baseball’s longstanding manipulation of the law to increase its own
profits to the detriment of thousands of MiLB players.115
IV. HOW MLB MANIPULATES THE LAW AND DREAMS TO PERPETUATE
THE INEQUALITY OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
The situation that minor leaguers face has developed as a result of three
predominant factors: decisions by the United States Supreme Court, laws
passed by Congress, and the lack of collective will to unionize.
A. The Failure of the Supreme Court
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits contracts or

107. Sneed, supra note 63.
108. See Major Leage Baseball, supra note 56, at 207-09. The “actual championship playing
season” includes only the schedule of regular-season games; it is five months long and does not
include spring training. See id. at 205-06.
109. Sneed, supra note 63. Minor league players are considered employees of the major league
team. Blum, supra note66.
110. Sneed, supra note 63.
111. See Major League Baseball, supra note 56, at 183.
112. Sneed, supra note 63.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See infra Part IV.
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conspiracies in restraint of trade.116 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this prohibition to encompass only unreasonable restraints of trade.117
Application of the Sherman Act therefore does not guarantee a plaintiff a
win.118
The challenged practice only violates the Act if the
precompetitive benefits do not outweigh the anticompetitive effects.119
However, the plaintiff does not have to win such a balancing test if the
practice fits into one of four judicially declared per se violations.120
One of the most useful, and most disturbing, tools that Major League
Baseball uses to pay MiLB players like Johnson such low wages is the
antitrust exemption that was manufactured by a trio of twentieth century
Supreme Court cases commonly known as “the Supreme Court’s baseball
trilogy.”121 If taken out of the context of professional baseball and
implanted into nearly any other American industry, the Rule 4 Draft and
required UPCs would violate antitrust law as illegal restraints of trade.122
However, in 1922, Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion for the Court
in Federal Baseball Club v. National League, held that the business,
“giving exhibitions of baseball,” was a “purely state affair[].”123 The
Court acknowledged that baseball clubs travelled among the states, but
held that the business of baseball did not constitute interstate
commerce.124 The Court noted that “a firm of lawyers sending out a
member to argue a case . . . does not engage in [interstate] commerce
because the lawyer . . . goes to another State.”125 Thus, professional
baseball did not trigger federal antitrust law, and the antitrust exemption
was born.126 Federal Baseball, however, was consistent with the limited
interpretation of interstate commerce and federal power that permeated
Supreme Court jurisprudence prior to the revolutionary change in
perspective in 1937.127
Surprisingly, even after the vast expansion of the American
understanding of interstate commerce in the FDR era, Federal Baseball

116. 15 U.S.C. § 1(2018).
117. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
118. See id.
119. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1375, 1386 (2009).
120. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)(listing price fixing, division of
markets, tying arrangements, and group boycotts as per se violations).
121. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See infra notes
123–134 and accompanying text.
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
123. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
124. Id. at 209.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 208.
127. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109
(Foundation Press, 18th ed. 2013).
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persisted.128 In Toolson v. New York Yankees, the Court reaffirmed
Federal Baseball “so far as that decision determines that Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws.”129 In its 1953 opinion, the Court noted that:
Congress has had [Federal Baseball] under consideration but has not seen
fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having
prospective effect. The business has thus been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust
legislation. The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with
retrospective effect, hold the legislation applicable. We think that if there
are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust
laws it should be by legislation.130

The Court, therefore, did not apply its own expansive interpretation of
interstate commerce to baseball and decided Toolson’s case entirely on
the authority of Federal Baseball.131
The Court reaffirmed its belief that legislative, not judicial, action was
the proper avenue to apply antitrust laws to professional baseball in Flood
v. Kuhn.132 The Court, describing the antitrust exemption as an
established “aberration,” noted that it did not apply to other professional
sports and stated that professional baseball is indeed a business engaged
in interstate commerce pursuant to post–1937 Supreme Court
decisions.133 Nonetheless, the Court stated that it “continue[d] to be loath,
50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to
overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction,
has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and . . . has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.”134 Ironically, the
Supreme Court also concluded that state antitrust law did not apply to
baseball because it was engaged in interstate commerce.135
The Flood decision was not well received by the legal community.136
Dreams of baseball were of such importance in American culture that the
Supreme Court ignored decades of established precedent regarding the
definition of interstate commerce to give baseball its own exemption.137
128. See id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
129. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
130. Id. (alterations added).
131. See id.
132. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972).
133. Id. at 282–83.
134. Id. at 283–84.
135. See id. at 284–85.
136. See, e.g., Kevin D. McDonald, There’s No Tying in Baseball: On Illinois Tool and the
Presumption of Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2005, at 10
(“The result is a principle of antitrust law that is (1) indefensible as a matter of fact or policy, and
(2) an embarrassment to the Court.”).
137. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282–84.
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The tone of the opinion reflected baseball’s place in the American
dream.138 The opinion begins with a discussion of the history of the game
as the nation’s pastime and an extensive list of baseball’s immortals. 139
The majority also cites with glee the opinion denying Flood’s preliminary
injunction, in which District Court Judge Cooper stated that “[b]aseball .
. . enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. . . . The game is on
higher ground; it behooves everyone to keep it there.”140 In Flood, the
Supreme Court prevented the players from using the antitrust laws as they
were intended and preserved the owners’ control over the players and
their financial interests.141
B. The Failure of Congress
Congress finally acted legislatively in response to the outrageous Flood
decision—albeit twenty-eight years after the case—by passing the Curt
Flood Act of 1998.142 The Curt Flood Act stated that “the conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting
employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level are subject to the antitrust laws.”143 Congress effectively
overruled the Court and finally granted major league players the same
access to the antitrust laws that every American enjoys.144 Since the
passage of the act, compensation packages for major league players have
risen even more dramatically.145
However, the Curt Flood Act, without explanation, expressly states that
it does not apply to any actions of those “engaging in, conducting or
participating in the business of . . . [Minor League Baseball], any
organized professional baseball amateur or first-year player draft . . . any
reserve clause as applied to minor league players . . . or any other matter
relating to professional baseball’s minor leagues.”146 Congress has
therefore decided that MiLB players cannot successfully challenge the
Rule 4 Draft and UPC reserve clauses as illegal restraints of trade under

138. See id. at 260–64.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 266–67 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
141. See id. at 282–85.
142. See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (Codified at 15 U.S.C. §
26b (2018)).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a)(2018).
144. See supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
145. See Cork Gaines & Skye Gould, The Salaries for Baseball’s Highest-paid Players have
Skyrocketed over the Past 20 Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:44 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/mlb-average-highest-paid-salary-2017-4.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 26(b)(1) (2018).
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Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.147 Thus, MiLB players have
been, and will continue to be, unable to remedy their situation on antitrust
grounds even though Major League Baseball players can do so.
Why would Congress remove the exemption for those players who
make the most money and have the most resources while continuing the
exemption for those players with the least money and least resources?148
The legislative history indicates a clear and consistent effort to ensure that
the Curt Flood Act would have no impact on the legal status of MiLB.149
Congress was clearly protecting the economic interests of the Major
League Baseball owners by its inconsistent treatment of MiLB.150
Because minor leaguers lack the star power of their major league
counterparts and the lobbying power of the owners, they are in most need
of legislative protection. However, the modern democratic process again
failed to protect the interests of those least able to defend themselves. 151
In light of the seemingly insurmountable hurdles posed by an antitrust
challenge, lawsuits challenging minor league compensation in recent
years have focused on alleged violations of the FLSA minimum wage and
overtime requirements.152 MLB has traditionally relied on the FLSA
exemptions for “employee[s] employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity” and for seasonal amusement or
recreational establishments in 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(1) & (3). 153 Major
League Baseball, which has stated that “being a Minor League Baseball
player is not a career but a short-term seasonal apprenticeship[,]”
determined that a loss in court “would cost it approximately $110 million,
a figure that could double if the court assigned damages, and none of that
accounts for additional costs going forward.”154
After spending $330,000 on lobbying expenses in 2015, Major League
Baseball increased its lobbying efforts by 300%, spending $1.32 million
in each of the next two years in response to class-action suits filed by

147. See id.; see also McDowell, supra note 94, at 15.
148. See supra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
149. See S. REP. NO. 105-118, pt. 2, at 4–5 (1997).
150. See id.
151. Nearly 28% of minor league players are foreign-born, about 80% of which come from
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. J.J. Cooper, Numbers Game: Makeup of the Minors,
BASEBALL AMERICA (May 4, 2018), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/numbers-gamemakeup-of-the-minors/. At the major league level, a study by the Society for American Baseball
Research revealed that, in 2016, the racial composition of the major leagues was 63.7% White, 6.7%
African-American, 27.4% Latino, and 2.1% Asian. Mark Armour & Daniel R. Levitt, Baseball
Demographics,
1947–2016,
SOCIETY
FOR
AMERICAN
BASEBALL
RESEARCH,
https://sabr.org/bioproj/topic/baseball-demographics-1947-2012 (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
152. See, e.g., Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F.Supp.3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2018).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(2018); 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)(2018); See Senne v. Kan. City Royals
Baseball Corp., No. 14-CV-00608-JCS, 2015 WL 6152476, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015).
154. Berg, supra note 37; Brown, supra note 48.
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former minor league players.155 As a result of this increased lobbying
effort, Congress passed legislation expressly exempting MiLB from the
requirements of the FLSA.156
The ironically named “Save America’s Pastime Act,” (SAPA) which
was included on page 1,967 of the 2,232-page March 2018 Senate
appropriations bill, passed without a single co-sponsor or sufficient time
to debate.157 The SAPA “saved” an eleven-figure industry by preying on
its powerless, invisible backbone that actually needs to be saved.158 The
language of the 2018 SAPA nearly mirrors that of a stand-alone version
of the bill introduced in 2016.159 Support for the 2016 SAPA was
withdrawn within days of its introduction after a quick and harsh public
uproar.160 Commentators have described the enacted SAPA as “a
textbook piece of special-interest legislation[.]”161 The Legislature’s
willingness to severely disadvantage a particular group of struggling
people at the whim of a $10 billion industry is alarming, especially when
the cost of vastly improving the plight of MiLB players is comparatively
small.162
The enacted 2018 SAPA keeps MiLB players at the status quo by
nearly ensuring that they will be unable to remedy their situations on
FLSA grounds.163 The impact of this momentous decision to give Major
155. See Senne, 2015 WL 6152476, at *1; Blake Yagman, Senne v. Royals is the Case that
Could
Change
Major
League
Baseball,
FANSIDED
(Oct.
25,
2017),
https://fansided.com/2017/10/25/senne-v-royals-lawsuit-could-change-mlb/; Blum, supra note66.
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018).
157. H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. §201 (2018) (enacted); see Durham, supra note 95, at 18.
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (a)(19)(2018); see supra note 51 and accompanying text; see supra
Part III.B.
159. See Blum, supra note66.
160. See H.R. 5580. See, e.g., Ted Berg, The ‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ in Congress will
do Nothing of the Sort, USA TODAY (June 30, 2016, 10:30
AM),
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/06/save-americas-pastime-act-minor-league-minimum-wagelawsuit-mlb-salaries; Aaron Blake, After Outcry over Minor League Baseball Bill, Congresswoman
Can’t Disown it Fast Enough, THE WASH. POST (June 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/30/after-outcry-over-bill-on-minor-league-baseball-paycongresswoman-cant-disown-it-fast-enough/?utm_term=.df099baf8bf1; Ryan Fagan, Despicable
‘Save America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Screw Minor Leaguers, SPORTING NEWS (June 29, 2016),
http://www.sportingnews.com/us
/mlb/news/minor-league-save-americas-pastime-act-salariesantitrust-exemption-broshuis-congress/1jjn290g1ubcd18af2tjyb1u7l; Lindsay Gibbs, The ‘Save
America’s Pastime Act’ Aims to Keep Minor League Baseball Players in Poverty, THINKPROGRESS
(June 30, 2016, 5:10 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/the-save-americas-pastime-act-aims-to-keepminor-league-baseball-players-in-poverty-2f812a055701/.
161. Nathaniel Grow, The Save America’s Pastime Act: Special-Interest Legislation
Epitomized, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1013, 1046 (2019).
162. See Mueller, infra note 184 (“For an investment of $7.5 million per year, an MLB
organization could adequately pay their minor leaguers, which would allow those players to eat
better, get better housing during the season, and train better in the offseason.”); see also Berg, supra
note 37 (“A major league organization with 250 players in its minor league system could give every
single one of them a $30,000 annual pay spike for a total of $7.5 million, or roughly the cost of a
decent fourth outfielder on the free-agent market.”). But see McDowell, supra note 94, at Part V.
163. See Brown, supra note 48; Durham, supra note 95, at 18.
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League Baseball legislative permission to skirt FLSA requirements is
already evident. After the passage of SAPA, Major League Baseball
proposed eliminating forty-two minor leagues teams in negotiations for
the next PBA.164 News of this proposal quickly drew bipartisan
opposition from the very Congress that emboldened major league owners
by consistently allowing the league to act as if it is above the law.165
Perhaps recognizing their own failure, some members of Congress
“launched the Save Minor League Baseball Task Force for a simple
purpose — to help ensure a level playing field in the negotiations between
Major League Baseball and MiLB so that they yield a fair resolution and
protect minor league baseball in communities across the country.”166 This
task force is motivated by congressional self-interest, as it is focused on
preventing the elimination of teams that could negatively impact local
economies, rather than addressing past legislative missteps such as the
Curt Flood Act and SAPA, which have allowed the horrific conditions of
MiLB to germinate.
In reaction to the Congressional Task Force, the Major League
Baseball Commissioner’s Office sent a memo to the teams detailing plans
to raise MiLB minimum salaries in 2021.167 However, this concession
was motivated by fear of Congressional action rather than a desire to
eliminate the plight of MiLB players. Even after this pay increase takes
effect, the majority of MiLB players will still live below the poverty
line.168 Despite mandatory spring training and other offseason obligations
that frequently interfere with a player’s ability to maintain stable
offseason employment, players are still only paid during the season.169
Although it is a step in the right direction, this pay increase is far from
adequate and would still result in FLSA violations if MLB had not
purchased the immunity granted by SAPA.
C. The Failure of Collective Activity
MiLB players also lack union representation as a means of improving

164. Eric Stephen, MLB’s Fight with Minor League Baseball is Getting Uglier, SB NATION
(Dec. 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2019/12/17/21023144/minor-leaguebaseball-negotiations-mlb-bernie-sanders-rob-manfred.
165. See Alex Gangitano, MLB, Congress Play Hardball in Fight over Minor Leagues, THE
HILL (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-alobbying/481755-mlb-congress-play-hardball-in-fight-over-minor-leagues.
166. Id.
167. See Associated Press, supra note 67 (“Players at rookie and short-season levels will see
their minimum weekly pay raised from $290 to $400, and players at Class A will go from $290 to
$500. Double-A will jump from $350 to $600, and Triple-A from $502 to $700.”).
168. See id.; see also Federal Poverty Level (FPL), supra note 80.
169. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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their financial situation.170 In fact, the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), which does not represent the minor leagues, has
used matters that affect minor leaguers as convenient concessions in their
own negotiations and have even made minor league conditions worse.171
Unionization and the resulting ability to bargain collectively could be an
effective avenue to remedy the dismal conditions of the minor leagues.
However, the transient nature of the players, wide geographic dispersion,
and low salaries present major hurdles to unionization.172 However, the
players’ fear of potential retaliation or “blackballing” presents perhaps the
most formidable obstacle to unionization.173 This fear of retaliation is
another example of owners manipulating players’ baseball dreams.
Marvin Miller, the transformational former Executive Director of the
MLBPA, has even said that one of the obstacles to unionizing the minor
leagues is the “dreamy idealism of the players.”174 In effect, a player is
concerned that participation in union activity will cost him his shot at
making it to the major leagues one day.175
A final formidable obstacle to unionization is the split among the minor
league players who received large signing bonuses and those who did not.
Players with large bonuses not only have more resources but are also often
fast-tracked to the major leagues.176 In the minors, their interests are
frequently aligned with major league management. The consistent refusal
of these minor league “stars” to join any unionization efforts have also
been a significant factor in the failure of all efforts to unionize minor
league players.
Collective bargaining would undoubtedly help improve the financial
condition of most MiLB players.177 The potential benefits of a union are
illustrated by another group that is crucial to the MiLB ecosystem—the
umpires.178 The minor league umpires, who are unionized, received a
myriad of perks under their new collective bargaining agreement,
including improved hotels and increased salaries and per diems.179 The
per diems for umpires at every level are higher than the per diems the
170. See Garrett R. Broshuis, Touching Baseball’s Untouchables: The Effects of Collective
Bargaining on Minor League Baseball Players, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 51 (2013).
171. Id. at 90.
172. Id. at 98–100.
173. See id. at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37.
174. Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (Apr. 3, 2012, 11:08 AM),
https://slate.com/culture/2012/04/minor-league-union-thousands-of-pro-baseball-players-makejust-1100-per-month-where-is-their-cesar-chavez.html.
175. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 100; see also Berg, supra note 37.
176. See supra Part III.A.
177. See Broshuis, supra note 170, at 98–99.
178. See Liz Roscher, Minor League Umpires are Getting Better Perks in Their New CBA,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/minor-league-umpiresare-getting-better-perks-in-their-new-cba-155352828.html.
179. See id.
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players themselves receive, and the umpires’ monthly salaries are higher
than the salaries of most MiLB players.180 These perks are made possible
partly by the fact that MiLB is generating record levels of merchandising
revenue.181
Additionally, the financial success of MiLB allows for teams to offer
free concessions to fans for an entire half inning.182 This promotional
“Food Purge”—as it is advertised by the Lansing Lugnuts—ironically
juxtaposes the financial ability of the organization to offer fans free
concessions while many of the Lugnuts players the fans came to see
struggle to adequately feed themselves.183
Advocates for minor league unionization point to the Professional
Hockey Players Association (PHPA) as evidence of its feasibility.184 The
PHPA is “a 50-year-old union that represents some 1,600 minor league
hockey players across the American Hockey League and the East Coast
Hockey League. The PHPA has successfully negotiated to guarantee its
members reasonable wages, in-season housing, adequate per diems, and
revenue sharing, among other benefits.”185 MiLB teams play more games
per season and have higher average attendance per game, but the players
only receive about 25% of the minimum salary and 1/3 of the travel per
diem compared to their counterparts in the American Hockey League
(”AHL”).186 Additionally, AHL players can earn postseason bonuses,
whereas MiLB players cannot.187 In sharp contrast to MiLB players,
“[p]layers in the AHL are unionized and have a minimum salary of
$45,000, get a postseason bonus, and $72 per diem.”188
While the need to unionize and bargain collectively is clear, the MiLB
players’ desperate financial situations, the widespread fear of retaliation,
and the reticence of stars to support the collective unit have consistently
delivered fatal blows to past unionization efforts.189 Of these three
obstacles, improving the compensation of MiLB players may be the
easiest to change. The bleak prospect of unionization is unlikely to
180. See id.
181. See David Broughton, Appeal of MiLB Merchandise Continues to Grow; Sales Hit $70M
in
2017,
SPORTS
BUS.
J.,
July
23,
2018,
available
athttps://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/07/23/Research-and-Ratings/MiLBmerchandise.aspx.
182. See Minor League Baseball (@milb), INSTAGRAM (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.instagram.com/p/Btghc4EFViC/?utm_source=ig_share_sheet&igshid=19qdju20qr0vy
183. See id.
184. See Bobby Mueller, MLB and Minor League Salaries: The Ugly Business Side of
Baseball, CALLTOTHEPEN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://calltothepen.com/2018/03/22/mlb-minor-uglybusiness/; see also Berg, supra note 37.
185. Berg, supra note 37.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mueller, supra note 184.
189. See supra notes 173—175 and accompanying text.
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improve until the financial situation of the individual players improves.
The result is a vicious cycle in which the players’ poor financial
conditions perpetuate their lack of a union, and their lack of a union
worsens their financial conditions. If Congress were to remove both the
antitrust and FLSA exemptions, the financial condition of minor league
players would improve and collective activity would be more likely.
MiLB players have made some efforts to help themselves short of
unionization. In response to the SAPA, Jeremy Wolf founded More Than
Baseball, a 501(c)(3) public charity to support MiLB players.190 Wolf, a
31st round draft pick by the New York Mets in 2016, started the
organization “as a way to help minor leaguers receive the housing,
equipment, and food they need to survive.”191 More Than Baseball aims
to spread awareness to fans and uncover baseball’s best kept secret,
explaining on its website that “over 4000 minor league ballplayers are in
need of financial assistance[,]” and that the players “are subject to poor
working conditions and are on the hook for their own housing, equipment,
and nutrition.”192
More Than Baseball “refuse[s] to allow any ballplayers go to bed
hungry and wake up on an air mattress only to play in front of thousands
of paying fans per night.”193 The organization, which is available to all
minor leaguers, helps the players obtain essential baseball equipment in
addition to basic living necessities such as proper nutrition and affordable
housing.194 Additionally, More Than Baseball provides career and
financial services to prepare players for life after baseball, which is
particularly important considering that only a small fraction of minor
leaguers advance to the big leagues.195 While laudable, More Than
Baseball does not remedy the financial exploitation of MiLB players just
as a soup kitchen does not solve the problem of homelessness.
V. CONCLUSION
In a democracy, the legislature should reflect the concepts of fairness
and equality which the nation truly values. As Congress has become
increasingly influenced by uber-wealth, the growth of income inequality
has reduced the ideals of fairness and equality to their bare minimum.
This reality is easily identified in the plight of most MiLB players.
190. Meet the Staff, , MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/about-us
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
191. Id.
192. Mission, MORE THAN BASEBALL, https://www.morethanbaseball.org/mission (last
visited Feb. 17, 2020).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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Although Supreme Court decisions and the players’ own lack of
collective will has worsened the situation, it is Congress who has
perpetuated the appalling economic reality for the players who support
the foundation of Major League Baseball. Neither the House nor the
Senate has provided any rationale for explicitly preventing MiLB players
from suing Major League Baseball based on the nation’s antitrust laws196
or the FLSA.197 The only explanation is the influence of wealthy Major
League Baseball owners over Congress, as reflected by their increased
lobbying expenditures.198 Given the public outcry against the first attempt
by Congress to exempt MiLB players from federal minimum wage laws,
Congress’ actions can also be characterized as counter majoritarian.
Congress should therefore repeal both the antitrust immunity and the
exemption from the FLSA it has given Major League Baseball and the
owners. The cost of doing so will not destroy major or minor league
baseball. The result will simply lift the majority of minor league players
from poverty by reducing the profits of Major League Baseball owners
only incidentally. The games will still flourish. In addition, such action
by Congress will make collective activity by MiLB players more likely.
As the nation’s pastime, the game of baseball “reflects a host of ageold American tensions: between workers and owners, scandal and reform,
the individual and the collective.”199 Baseball even had a key role in the
beginning of racial equality in America.200 Baseball has been “a sort of
Rosetta stone for deciphering our still revolutionary experiment in
nationhood[,]” and the game “has realized—through individualized
brilliance or teamwork or racial harmony—the highest of our country’s
ideals.”201 Baseball has advanced our nation, and the undeniable parallels
between the game and the law were acknowledged in the Federal
Baseball opinion.202 In return, the law has largely turned its back on the
game’s most vulnerable.203 By rectifying its past mistakes, Congress can

196. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. Other sports capitalists understand the
value of lobbying congress. Because California passed a statue allowing its collegiate athletes to
profit from their name, image, and likeness, the NCAA and some conferences have dramatically
increased their lobbying expenditures in an attempt to get Congress to pass a law on the subject
favorable to their interests. See Cassandra Negley, NCAA, ACC, Big 12 Spend Nearly $1M to
Prevent Athletes from Profiting Off Own Likeness, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2020, 6:28 PM),
https://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa-acc-big-12-spend-nearly-1-m-to-keep-athletes-from-earningmoney-off-marketing-deals-232823064.html.
199. Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, Where Memory Gathers, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY xvii, xvix (1st ed., 1994).
200. See John Thorn, Why Baseball, in BASEBALL: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 58, 61 (1st ed.,
1994).
201. Id. at 58.
202. See id.; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part IV.
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provide a solution to baseball’s best kept secret—the treatment of
MiLB—and may truly save America’s pastime. In so doing, Congress
would also be taking a first step in realizing its own responsibility in
eliminating income inequality in America.
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